12 - Network State Conference 2026 - Will AI Break Cryptography?
Open original source ↗uh preemptively I will be running off
for a flight before this panel ends. So
I'm going to uh hand off moderator
responsibilities to hib for the end. But
to get us off kicked off, we had a tweet
that rocketed around the world last
night from Justin Drake uh telling
everyone to not panic. Um
>> of course they panicked.
>> Of course they panicked. And this is
about uh the correctness the the
validity of cryptography and math. Um
and I do want to talk about crypto in
the longer term but now because people
are panicking I think we need to talk
about math and cryptography in the short
term. Uh the fear is that AI has truly
accelerated timelines on a massive scale
to compress uh tricks uh shortcuts to
break classical cryptography and then
also accelerate the arrival of Qday as
well. Uh the day that quantum computers
can break uh cryptography as well. So,
two different paths to breaking down the
entire foundation of what the blockchain
industry rests upon. Uh, Hib, you've
already written an article. I'm
wondering if you can kind of just give
me your first impressions, your first
thoughts to to this fear about AI
threatening the entire industry.
>> Yeah. So, I I made the analogy that this
has sort of become cryptographic
dumerism. Uh it's a sphere that like if
if you look at most of the cryptography
that we use today uh we don't actually
have any proofs that this cryptography
is sound. Uh the the way that we battle
test cryptography is we create new
cryptographic schemes and we get a bunch
of smart people cryptographers to look
at these schemes and say like hey can
you come up with a way to break this and
after enough time after enough people
after enough years if people don't find
ways to break it then we say well this
is probably pretty strong cryptography.
Uh that that said cryptography does
degrade over time people do find attacks
they find ways to weaken a given
protocol. Um but we sort of measure the
security of most of our cryptography not
in terms of formal mathematical
guarantees which we don't have but
rather in terms of the person hours the
the sort of the the the mathematical
intelligence that we have applied to
these problems and haven't found a way
to break them. Well, if that's true,
then if you have Open AI now pointing
their lasers at classical cryptography,
it may well be that all of the human
cryptographers in the world, which is
maybe around 10,000 at most, have
applied this much intelligence and
compute to looking at all the
cryptography we have. And it could be
that over the next month, we apply this
much compute to all the cryptography in
the world. in which case we may just be
totally unprepared for how many holes
exist in the foundations of classical
cryptography. I think that point is
correct. That said, the question is what
are you going to do about it? If the
answer is what Justin Drake advocated
for, which is what he calls bunker mode
and bunker mode, the idea is don't move.
Move all your coins to an address that
has never signed anything. Put your head
in the sand and like basically, you
know, buy or use a blockchain.
>> Exactly. But, you know, buy buy a villa
in New Zealand and like escape from
society because you just don't know. It
might be a smoking crater when you're
done. That is a bad answer.
>> That is the equivalent of doomerism
which is like, "Oh my god, you know, AI
is going to kill everyone. So, just
like, you know, take no thought for
tomorrow and uh, you know, abandon your
family." I I this I think is the is is
the wrong answer to a correct
observation. Mhm.
>> So what what I advocated for in this
post is that every blockchain needs to
basically think of creating a
cryptographic recovery mode which is a
way that validators upon seeing
>> this what we were talking about
yesterday.
>> Exactly. Exactly. Upon seeing that there
is some kind of foundational problem in
cryptography that you can fall back to
like cold war level extremely austere
cryptography that makes minimal
assumptions. um basically like you know
this kind of hashbased cryptography
which is very slow, very expensive,
gigantic signatures, terrible bandwidth,
right? Blockchains would run at the
speed of molasses, but we know that
we're safe.
>> Mhm.
>> Like this is kind of like, okay, nuclear
codes went off. The the sirens are are
we all go into the bunker and we can
figure out what do we do now? What's our
next move to reconstruct once we know
what have been the problems that are
uncovered in cryptography? What
cryptographic solutions are safe? And
we'll probably actually learn a lot more
if AI is pointing.
>> AI will also help us develop methods and
pro and potentially prove the things we
couldn't prove before.
>> Exactly. Exactly.
>> You know, so go ahead. Say that. I was
going to say
>> no. No. So that that's basically the
proposal that I came up with which is
that
>> so this what we're talking about
yesterday that's a um very similar is
like I if you have a existing
pre-existing social smart contract or
coin holder agreement or DAO which says
under the conditions where there is some
new mathematical discovery that
invalidates this then we've all
pre-aggreed to maybe rewind state you
know to to two weeks ago everybody does
lose money but they lose less money than
zero or that this this and this
developer have emergency authority that
we can turn the keys and they can
upgrade these functions or whatever. Um,
the thing I find most interesting on
this whole thing, the the math
singularity was Matthew Green's
observation, I know Dev was arguing
about this, that public key cryptography
may not work, you know. And by the way,
the other thing that's funny about this,
there's been no coverage of this in like
the New York Times. They have salsberers
guys have no concept of how to even
report on this or talk about this. So,
and yet it influences every country in
the world in terms of whether they can
secure their systems. So network is just
moving far ahead the state. Anyway, some
thoughts I maybe your thoughts.
>> Yeah, I mean I think we actually when in
2018 we're designing near one of the
things we were designing for is like hey
look there going to be new cryptography.
We cannot bind near blockchain to a one
specific cryp cryptography curve. And so
we designed to be able to keep adding
more different methods. And so earlier
this year we just added MLDDSA which is
one of the first postquantum uh kind of
signatures. And you know given where
world is moving we're probably going to
add a hashbased signature as well so you
can kind of secure uh your system but I
think the broader point is like look you
cannot solidify and oify things you used
it in your post as well because the
world is evolving really quickly we're
going to keep inventing new things and
so the kind of protocol needs to be able
to continue evolve with that and we need
tooling to evolve uh in unison as well
and I think it's all it's all possible
we just need to be able to be in that
mode instead of saying like cool we're
going to build this and then nobody
touches it from here on.
>> So there's something else we talked
about yesterday which is the token
budget for the defense department of a
coin. You want
>> Yeah. Well, I think um one of one of the
points I want to make before we get to
that part is that
>> blockchains historically have been
designed to be very resistant to change.
Uh decentralization by its nature is a
very slow institutionalized governance
process. It means that in order for
something to change, there needs to be a
lot of buyin. There's no real way to
enforce things happening quickly. And
that is often considered to be a virtue
of decentralized systems is that like
they they are very very methodical in
the way that they end up making changes
over time. Um I I sort of analogize
this. This is this is sort of peace time
governance.
If we are going into a mode of
technological acceleration where the
ground underneath us is going to be
changing very rapidly in the midst of
this kind of mathematical singularity
then that is actually the wrong kind of
governance for a situation which is more
like wartime. M
>> wartime is often when you change the the
sort of civilian command structure and
you say look we have to go into more
command and control mode which means
that we do have to delegate more
authority to validators to developers
for them to be able to say hey just
went down and we have to react on a dime
to the fact that something fundamental
has changed and people are no longer
secure and we you have to trust us to
have the good judgment to go in and
change things.
>> So I'll give I'll give uh you know in
the network safe book I said uh the most
unpopular but important word going
forward is going to be recentralization.
>> Why? Because centralization,
decentralization, recentralization
basically means decentralization is just
a tactic. It's not like a destination.
It's a direction. Just like you steer
left and you steer right, you know,
recentralization is opposed by both the
centralized guys who say, "Wait a
second. if I thought you guys were, you
know, why don't you keep our existing
institutions? And the decentralization
guy said, "Wait a second. I thought we
were all anarchists. Aren't you
sacrificing?" But it's uh
recentralization is just finding a new
piece of digital land. It's just saying
we hit the fire alarm. We got out of
fiat. We got out of something and now
we're forming a new group. Or
recentralization is we have a network
governance rather than state governance.
And so then you don't have to say, "Oh,
we're, you know, we're doing a wrong
thing." We say this is a tool that we
will use in these circumstances. You
don't have to apologize for it.
>> Bali, I want to get your perspective on
as we proceed through this tumultuous
state in the world of math and
cryptography. There's a little bit of a
difference. There's quite a big
difference in the world of crypto, the
network state where the entire industry
is underpinned by the math. Whereas on
the state side of things with banks,
with web two, the cryptography, the
security, it's it's a means to an end.
It's not the main arc. It's not the main
thing. And so, while this uh the this
threat to math truly threatens all of
crypto, it's urgent for us. And on the
other side of this, it's an opportunity
for us to win. Whereas the the other
side of the world, it's not really their
core competency. It's not really their
main thing. It's just uh it's a it's a
an incumbrance for them. Do you think
this is an opportunity for the networks
state side of the world to really to
really shine?
>> Yes. And I actually also want to hear
Ilia's thoughts on this. But one of the
things taking our conversations from
yesterday putting together the right now
AI is an attack, right? Because you've
got this math singularity, you know, we
don't know how many results are going to
come out and things are going to
crumble. You know, things are going to
break in the short run and medium run.
But in the long run, um, you know, every
coin actually, so you're the new
moderator. Every coin has a very strong
Oh, see. Oh, okay. Fine. All right.
Okay. Every coin has a very strong
incentive to defend itself and has a
budget for that. And so the token budget
for auditing every line of code and also
paying mathematicians to run all this
stuff that becomes the cryptographic
defense department. And then you've got
the attackers over here. So to your
point before you said maybe there's
10,000 cryptographers in the world or
whatever that number is you can roughly
quantify sort of like with mining you
know like hash rate what is your um you
know token rate right so you what's
funny is this is a circular economy the
AI agents buy crypto tokens to spend and
then the crypto uh you know uh protocols
buy AI tokens so that you know these
guys are making sure they're not hacked
and these guys are proving they're So
there's a circular economy of AI agents
buying crypto tokens and crypto
protocols buying AI tokens. I think that
actually will be a significant part of
the future. I mean one way to frame it
is you need the protocol own compute.
>> Yeah. Right. You effectly need to have I
mean obviously we're coming from behind
for open AI entropic uh of the world but
the you know if we know anything about
blockchain we can motivate people to
bring a lot of compute uh up. I mean one
of the things is with AI you can
systematically enumerate exactly which
papers your blockchain depends on. like
you can literally list every single
paper that ECDSA depends on that you
know any any cryptographic scheme
assumption depends on and those are
almost like library calls in the sense
of a mathematical library or an
educational library and so you're
attacking them as soon as a new model is
posted on open router you ping it you
immediately are blasting tokens at it
you're trying to attack your own
foundations first much as we've sort of
learned to do for our JavaScript or
Python dependency is you start thinking
about math itself as a dependency that
has a supply chain vulnerability.
>> Well, it's it's interesting because I
think there's an asymmetry between uh
normal cyber security and what we're
talking about with this math
singularity. With normal cyber security,
I think many people worried that okay,
when models are going to become
superhuman at at cyber that there's just
going to be this just apocalypse of just
I don't know this like sort of
apocalypse now type hellscape of things
getting hacked left and right. And many
people have pointed out okay we now have
you know GLM 5.3 which is extremely good
at cyber it's open source it's uh very
easily accessible by anybody and yet
there is not this just you know kind of
planes falling out of the sky kind of
scenario that people were forecasting
for quite a while that you know the
reason why mythos and and Daybreak and
all these programs are whitelist only
not everybody can get access to these
models is because of this belief that if
people had access to them openly there
would just be total pandemonium. We
don't see that. Why don't we see that?
Where are all the hacks? Um you remember
last year there was um uh the
CrowdStrike attack. It was it was a
vulnerability. It wasn't even an attack
and it just took out like half the
internet. You know, air airplanes
weren't moving and civil society was
kind of grinding to a halt. Um the the
conjecture is that the reason why we're
not seeing that is that there's a
natural uh balance between attack and
defense with AI. is that actually um
giving defenders access to the same
power of AI that attackers get there is
not this as some people maybe thought it
might be true uh there's not an
advantage to attackers uh when defenders
also can spend tokens and attackers can
spend tokens they cancel each other out
and in fact maybe have an advantage
>> because the prompts also do matter right
so the angle of it it's not quite the
same as hash rate because you've got
angles of attack from the prompts
>> I would I would I would actually uh
argue that it's better than it was in
the human world. And here's so here's
the shape of my argument, okay? Um, in
the past before we had AIS, uh, you
would hire human attackers, right? So,
let's say you're in North Korea, you
would hire some hackers in North Korea
and they would go and try to attack a
protocol, right? And if you were a
defender as a protocol, you have to
come, you have to basically try to
defend against everything North Korea
can come up with. And all of North
Korea's hackers are all different.
They're all independent minds coming up
with different ways to try to attack
your protocol. But in a world where
North Korea is now spending tokens, uh
the thing about AIS is that AIs are much
more correlated with each other than
humans are correlated with each other.
Like you will see this is that if you
have seven AIs all trying to attack the
same problem, they will come up with
very similar solutions as they are
iterating and spending more and more
compute on the same problem. they don't
paralyze in ways that are as independent
as the way that humans paralyze because
they're trained from very similar
distributions even if they're different
models. Uh whereas humans we just act
very differently. We have much higher uh
diversity in dispersion in the way that
we come up with ideas. As a result of
that, if you have 10 models, let's say
North Korea and Russia and you know
somebody else are all attacking you,
it's very likely they will come up with
the same attack ideas. And so if each of
them spend a million dollars of comput
and you spend $2 million of compute,
it's very likely you will come up with
each of the ideas their models will come
up with because they're not coordinated.
>> It's interesting because let's let's say
that's true and it's possible
um if you take the enumeration of the
math papers as your library that
underpins you in the same way the
JavaScript and Python libraries do, then
you could say, okay, I've got a finite
attack surface now, right? I think for
for math you have like very different
level of uh like attacking math the
outcome you're going to break everything
right yeah like attacking a single
library or system you have like its
supply chain which I mean what we've
seen right now people starting to remove
dependencies in general in code because
actually dependency is a liability now
like it's easier to just write all your
code from scratch from kind of as basic
as possible and then audit it with a
bunch of agents uh and you have formal
notification now so you and actually
verify that the code. And so I think
actually in general the code building is
becoming like completely asymmetric
toward the builder because you you just
want to remove all dependencies and you
want to formally verify kind of as much
properties as possible. With math you
have effectively right now the the
fundamental like okay what is the like
even when we use forification we
actually have set of assumptions right
we say hey this is a hard problem like
for example we verifying zero knowledge
proofs there's a assumption in the lean
proof itself that this you know this
problem is hard and then from there we
verify that this Zcash for example has
no uh like double spend
>> and [snorts] that assumption itself is
what's getting banned and and indeed
like then everybody as an attacker it
makes sense to attack that fundamental
assumption.
>> Yes.
>> And spend all of the kind of cost on
that and you break everything, right?
>> You know, you know what's funny about
this? It strikes me um you know one of
the phenomena of the last few decades
has been previously obscure areas that
only mathematicians or computer
scientists cared about like formal
verification then some you know or
obviously you know machine learning and
so on and now pure math is about to have
an AI like bidding war right where those
salaries I mean all the mathematicians
today are depressed but in two or three
years it's going to their salaries are
going to 10x because
>> I I don't know that that's true. I think
>> let me give you my argument.
>> Okay. Yeah, please.
>> Basically, um the the human-guided
uh I mean because you have to prompt
these things, right? It's not like
anybody can just prompt their way to the
quasan hypothesis and you have to verify
it and prompting and verifying are still
skills.
>> I mean if you look at the Navier Stokes
story, yeah, I mean they made very clear
we did not know anything about Navier
Stokes. We did not. So we we're running
right now. We're number one on lean
bench line bench nobody read anything
this is like thermma theorem reman
hypothesis like this is like 120 most
sophisticated papers and we've like
verified them in lean we like you know
we don't even know some of the names
there
>> I you know but still even still if you
didn't comprehend what the symbols were
on screen how did you even know what the
lean was saying I
>> well the lean lean is like actually
>> I know but
>> okay well you could look at the output
of the program, but I I think it'd be
hard without domain knowledge to even
understand what one was looking at. You
don't you don't think
>> I mean I I think this is math code.
>> You disagree with
>> I think this is math code. I think it's
very clear that like there's a good
reason why mathematicians are
despondent, which is that look, this has
happened to programmers now. Programmers
now realize that like my job is forever
different. And like right now you need
you need humans to drive the models. Um
but it's very clear that the models are
now driving themselves more and more.
>> Yeah. But is that
>> but you need the problem solving skills
not like before as a mathematician your
goal was like to to you given a problem
and you go and like try to prove it
right and you spend you know decades
doing that. Now it is actually
formulating the problem is the skill.
>> Yeah. And this is for developers and now
for mathematics too. And that is a way
broader.
>> Yeah. prompting and verifying. I mean,
okay, I know there's a lean proof that's
out there, but
>> I mean, how many people know how to look
at lean proofs, right? That's actually
you don't actually need to look at lean
proof. You only need to look at the
statement and the statement is
>> math is falling because it is uniquely
self-verifying.
>> You I know, but basically look, you can
write down an equation. People can I I
think you guys are over even if the
number of people who can prompt these
things has increased and let's even say
it increased by an order of magnitude.
>> Yeah. I mean, how many people can type
in Navia Stokes with the Nablas and, you
know, so on, [laughter] right? It's
>> read read Scott Arensson on this. Go
ahead. Um, Scott Erensson, well known
quantum physicist.
>> I was actually just thinking about the
complexity zoo guy, right?
>> Um,
>> yeah, he's he's a complexity.
>> Yes. Yeah. Complexity theory. Yeah.
Yeah. And complexity classes.
>> Maybe before we finish, we should like
reinsure people uh about the crypto
side.
>> Okay. I know. Like
>> we're up on so maybe we should just give
a small thing. Uh, look, I do think what
we're talking about this this
cryptographic singularity, um, most
likely with with, you know, 95% plus
probability, what we're going to find
when AIs do work their way through all
this math is that, hey guys, you were
right. Cryptography works
overwhelmingly likely and even with most
of the equations that they've se
uh, OpenAI came through in the in the
big paper drop they had earlier this
week, what they found was that like
yeah, most of the things are what
mathematicians thought. There were very
few surprises in the sense that like oh
something we thought was true was false
or something we thought was false was
true. So most likely what we will find
is that we're like yes
>> that's interesting. I hadn't seen that.
So there's a 2x2 table of things they
thought were false that were false like
that's a useful
>> the Jacobian the Jacobian conjecture
that was surprising. We did not think
that there would be a counter example,
right? That was very surprising. Um but
for a lot of these things it's like yeah
of course they just we didn't have the
proof. We didn't have uh people thought
the answer was yes and the answer was
yes. But now we have a formalization.
>> You know all these guys like Scott
Aronson who look at the complexity of
different you know kinds of algorithms.
I think what we have to do is just try
to only work with those things that have
proven complexity results as opposed to
those things which have conjectured
difficulties. And I know that's easier
to say than it than it is, but because
one thing I think Justin Drake was
talking about this, which is hashes are
reliable and public key, you know, like
a like a elliptic curves aren't. And
then Dev had a counter argument on that.
What are what are your thoughts on that,
Elliot? Yeah, I mean I think kind of the
principle is the hashbased cryptography
is way like there's less of things there
and so it's like way simpler and so it
is more reliable and to's point like if
we do need a recovery mode that is our
backup and we should have this backup
available for everyone at the same time
it's extremely slow it's extremely
inefficient uh and you know yeah you
don't want to have you know high
performance blockchains relying on that
at the same time we do have now
latisbased cryptography that is
postquantum um that is actually what's
used now across the internet right your
browsers and we were just checking some
of the like uh some of the
implementation across TLS and other
places and indeed it is a conjecture too
right there's like hey this mathematical
problem of you know matrix
multiplication now is hard the benefit
is if that's solved we also like AI will
become way way simpler because it's the
same operation underneath and so I think
there's like a lot more um kind of room
we have. But that's why like yeah, we
cannot oify cryptography. We'll need to
continue continue innovating here. But
>> for right now, we're fine. And you know,
like people who are working in the space
are all really on top of this and really
continue innovating to make sure to be
ahead of it. Okay,
>> good. Let's wrap. We got a wrap. Yeah.
But uh thank you everybody and um
cryptography is going to be okay.